A Pattern of Ruling Against Mother Nature: Wildlife Species Cases Decided by Justice Kavanaugh by Snape, William J, III
Sustainable Development Law & Policy 
Volume 19 
Issue 1 Fall 2018: Jurisprudence in 
Environmental Law 
Article 2 
A Pattern of Ruling Against Mother Nature: Wildlife Species Cases 
Decided by Justice Kavanaugh 
William J. Snape III 
American University Washington College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp 
 Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law 
Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy 
Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law 
of the Sea Commons, Litigation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law 
Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Snape, William J. III (2018) "A Pattern of Ruling Against Mother Nature: Wildlife Species Cases Decided by 
Justice Kavanaugh," Sustainable Development Law & Policy: Vol. 19 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp/vol19/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University 
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
A p ATTERN OF RULING AGAINST MOTHER NATURE: 
WILDLIFE SPECIES CASES DECIDED BY JUSTICE KAVANAUGH 
ON THE DC CIRCUIT 
By William J. Snape, Ur* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
B rett Kavanaugh was sworn in as the I 14th individual to serve on the United States Supreme Court on October 6, 2018, following perhaps the most acrimonious Sen-
ate debate and vote in history. 1 Before this nomination to be 
an associate justice, Justice Kavanaugh served on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for twelve years.2 
Although many progressive and citizen interest groups have 
expressed concern or objection over the nomination - including 
environmental groups concerned about a wide range of issues 
from climate change and toxic pollutants to safe drinking water 
and scientific integrity - no systematic analysis of his D.C. Cir-
cuit decisions has been done for wildlife conservation.3 The fed-
eral laws of wildlife protection - including endangered species, 
migratory bird, and marine mammal statutes - raise important 
and poignant questions about the human relationship with the 
natural world , and about the rule of law generally. Because wild-
1 ife is generally not owned by any human until lawfully taken 
into possession, society 's treatment of wildlife reveals not only 
our shared values outside the modern market system, but also 
our compassion for other sentient beings.4 
During his dozen years on the federal bench, Justice 
Kavanaugh has been a part of eighteen wildlife species deci-
sions and has ruled against wildlife 17 .25 times ,5 this is a 
ninety-six (96) percent record against wildlife. By comparison, 
D.C. Circuit Judge David Sentelle, a former Chief Judge and 
conservative jurist, possesses a 57-43 "against wildlife" score.6 
Judge Merrick Garland, a former Chief Judge and moder-
ate jurist, possesses a 46-54 "against wildlife" score.7 In sum, 
Justice Kavanaugh's ninety-six percent anti-wildlife record is 
significantly higher than comparable conservative and moderate 
scores of fifty-seven percent anti-wildlife (Sentelle) and forty-
six percent anti-wildlife (Garland) records . 
These numbers, along with Justice Kavanaugh 's own words 
through his written decisions, demonstrate a tangible and sig-
nificant bias against wildlife conservation. Whenever a vested 
economic interest runs up against a wildlife conflict, Justice 
Kavanaugh almost always rules against the public interest in 
wildlife protection. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
All D.C. Circuit cases mentioning the word "species," 
"marine mammal," "wildlife," or " migratory bird" were identi-
fied, using the names ofJudges Kavanaugh, Sentelle, and Garland 
as an additional filter.8 Several cases identified possessed more 
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than one of the searched terms. Many other identified cases had 
one or more terms, but possessed no cause of action or sought 
relief pertaining to actual wildlife protection in any way; these 
cases were excluded from this study.9 All of the wildlife cases 
involving Justice Kavanaugh are listed and discussed in this 
paper. 10 The methodology was a conservative approach because 
where wildlife conservation was a background issue and the 
decision was based on a procedural matter unrelated to federal 
wildlife law, the case was excluded from the analysis . Similarly, 
Justice Kavanaugh cases primarily dealing with public health or 
general environmental issues were also excluded from this study. 
The wildlife cases (and their dispositions) decided by Judge 
Sentelle and Judge Garland are included in the Appendices of 
this article. Justice Kavanaugh 's ninety-six percent anti-wildlife 
record is significantly higher than comparable conservative and 
moderate scores of fifty-seven percent anti-wildlife (Sentelle) 
and forty-six percent anti-wildlife (Garland) records . 
III. ANALYSIS 
Federal wildlife law is mostly a statutory or treaty-based 
phenomenon implemented by federal agency rules and policies. 11 
Traditionally, states hold their primary jurisdiction over wildlife 
in trust for their citizens.12 Utilizing primarily the commerce, 
tax, treaty, and/or federal lands clauses of the U.S. Constitution, 
Congress has been participating in wildlife conservation efforts 
in the United States since the 1900 Lacey Act. 13 
Today, a bevy of federal statutes - ranging from the 
Endangered Species Act14 and Marine Mammal Protection Act15 
to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act16 and the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fisheries Conservation Act, 17 not to mention the ational 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 18 and public lands laws 19 
provide protections to thousands of different fish and wildlife 
species. While the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
figures into some of these federal wildlife decisions, most of the 
decisions are by other "environmental" agencies including the 
Department of the Interior, Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) and Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Department 
of Commerce, Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS), the Army Corps of Engineers, the Forest Service under 
*Fellow, Practitioner-in-Residence , and Assistant Dean for Adjunct Faculty 
Affairs, American University, Washington College of Law. Senior Counsel , 
Center for Biological Diversity. Chairman of Board of Directors, Endangered 
Species Coalition. B.A., Honors College, magna cum laude, University of Cali-
fornia , Los Angeles; J.D. , George Washington University. 
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the Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, and 
others . 
Examining Justice Kavanaugh 's wildlife cases on the D .C. 
C ircuit is instructive for at least two reasons. First, these cases 
invo lve a variety and divers ity of parti es and legal issues that 
affect many other sectors of society. Second, the entire concept 
of wildlife conservation is frequently one where a vested and 
spec ifi c economic interest is somehow pitted against the public's 
interest in wildli fe protection generally. All U.S. w ildlife statutes 
possess mechanisms to address and ameli orate these conflicts, 
but because onl y a human being can currently possess legal 
standing to sue in U.S. courts , humans seeking to protect wild-
li fe species often must literally challenge other human economic 
development. In other words, the "public interest" is frequently 
the central beneficiary of wildlife conservation because wildlife, 
by defi nition, is owned by no one in partic ul ar, but he ld in trust 
under the law for all people.20 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh ho lds we l 1-recogn ized skepti-
cism in other areas of environmental law such as Clean Air 
Act protection and global warming regul ation.21 The question 
acco rdingly ari ses whether Justice Kavanaugh possesses other 
obj ective bi ases. 22 In this study, a ll of Justice Kavanaugh 's 
D.C. Circuit decisions invo lving animal and plant species were 
analyzed, as di scussed in the Methodology. 23 An exam ination 
of wildli fe law is a lso relevant and timely because the Supreme 
Court has recently shown renewed interest in the Endangered 
Spec ies Act (ESA) by deciding an ESA case this term , 
Weyerhaeuser Company v. US Fish and Wildlife Service. 24 In 
this 8-0 decision, which Justice Kavanaugh did not parti c ipate 
in because he had not yet been confirmed , the Court held that 
the Secretary of Interior's decision not to exclude portions of 
critical habitat under the ESA was reviewable agency action 
by a federa l court.25 The Supreme Court remanded to the F ifth 
Circuit to determine whether the FWS decision not to exclude 
any dusky gopher frog critical habitat o n about 1500 acres 
owned by Weyerhaeuser, was arbitrary and capricious in li ght of 
the economic analysis performed by FWS consultants, as well 
as the entire administrative record including the agency expert 's 
scientific assessment of the biological suitability of the lands in 
question. 26 It is quite plausible that thi s case could again find its 
way back to the Supreme Court after the Fifth Circuit makes its 
factual determination of the new legal framework articulated by 
Chief Justice Roberts in this unanimous decision . 
Justice Kennedy was often the swing vote on the United 
States Supreme Court in favo r of environmental and wildlife 
protection under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, ESA, and 
other laws.27 Justice Kavanaugh, however, does appear to have a 
stati stically proven bias against wildlife species during litigation. 
Of the eighteen (l8) wildlife species cases that he has active ly 
participated on during his twelve-year tenure on the D .C. Circuit, 
he has ruled against wildlife spec ies over seventeen times ( l 7.25 
to be exact, because two dec is ions possessed "sp lit" species 
outcomes). Thus, wildlife species lose approximate ly ninety-six 
percent of the time when before Justice Kavanaugh. In addition , 
when Justice Kavanaugh issues written dec isions on wildlife 
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species himself, they are always strong ly and stridently on the 
side against wi ldli fe and species protection. 
Whenever wildlife is up against either a corporation or 
the Republican Party, Justice Kavanaugh seemingly goes out 
of his way to defeat wildlife.28 For example, in American Bird 
Conservancy v. Federal Communications Commission,29 Justice 
Kavanaugh, in di ssent, misstated the conservation pla intiff's 
injuries .30 In Carpenter Industrial Council v. Zinke,31 Justice 
Kavanaugh granted standing to the timber industry to challenge 
threatened spotted owl critical hab itat on federa l public lands. 
32 He explained that even if the industry only lost one dollar as 
a result of the critical habitat designation, it would still consti-
tute an " injury-in-fact fo r standing purposes. 33 In Otay Mesa, 
LP v. Department of the lnterior,34 Justice Kavanaugh, in an 
ESA criti cal habitat case, held FWS biologists to a very hi gh 
level of scientific certainty.35 In Mingo Logan v. Environmental 
Protection Agency,36 Justice Kavanaugh, in di ssent, soug ht 
to overturn EPA's decision to address massive water po llu-
tion from mounta intop removal for coal extraction. 37 West 
Virginia v. US Environmental Protection Agency,38 was one 
of a series of decis ions and currently active cases where Justice 
Kavanaugh expressed hostility toward regul ating green house 
gases that kill wildlife and humans alike.39 In Fund for Animals 
v. Kempthorne,40 JUstice Kavanaugh di smissed the importance 
of four mi gratory bird treaties in a separate and unnecessary 
concurrence.41 
These wildlife species-related decisions, including Justice 
Kavanaugh's frequently aggressive opinions, are di scussed and 
analyzed more fully below, in chronological order. Cumul ative ly, 
Justice Kavanaugh 's ninety-s ix percent record against w ildli fe 
represents a noticeable bias.42 
IV. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH'S 
DEMONSTRATED ANTI-WILDLIFE 
BIAS IN D.C. CIRCUIT CASES 
Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3 d 872 (D .C. C ir. 
2006) (two opinions by Justice Kavanaugh). 
In Justice Kavanaugh 's first w ildli fe case on the D.C. 
Circuit, he made hi s anti-wildlife sentiment immediate ly 
known.43 He took the unusual step of writing both the opinion of 
the court, as well as an unnecessary concurring opinion, which 
no other judge joined .44 In hi s concurrence, he addressed his 
view that the Migratory Bird Treaties45 are not self-executing, 
and thus deserve no credence in interpreting the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act (MBTA) itse lf. 46 This pos ition completely ignored 
the many treaties that have shaped U .S. wildlife statutes.47 It is 
a lso a position that revealed Justice Kavanaugh 's many conflict-
ing views on executive power and privilege.48 In this case, an 
animal welfare group and property owners challenged the FWS 
decision not to li st the mute swan as protected under the MBTA 
in response to a pl an by the Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources to kill a portion of the state's adult mute swans.49 The 
MBTA was passed in 1918 pursuant to the first Migratory Bird 
Treaty of 19 16 with the United Kingdom and Canada, and the 
statute explicitly makes it "unlawful to hunt or kill migratory 
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birds included in the term s of the conventi ons. "5° Congress 
amended the MBTA in 2004 so that it " applies only to migratory 
bird species that are nati ve to the United States" or its te rrito-
ries .51 T he pla inti ffs argued here that the MBTA still includes 
protectio n fo r the mute swan because : (l) the statute still reads 
tha t it is " unl awful ... [to] hunt . . . [or] kill . . . any migratory 
bird . . . that is included in the terms of the conventions," and the 
" sense of Congress" provis io n within the amended statute stated 
that, " it is the sense of Congress that the language of the section 
is cons istent w ith the intent and language of the [fo ur] bilateral 
treati es imple mented by thi s section," and (2) the statute must 
therefore be deemed ambig uous and not interpreted to abrogate 
a treaty.52 Justi ce Kavanaug h ruled aga inst w ildli fe by ho lding 
that the MBTA excluded mu te swans despite the wording of the 
fo ur mig ratory bird treaties to the contrary. 53 
Justi ce Kavana ug h Decis ion in Fund for Animals: Against 
Wildli fe Species 
Oceana v. Gutierrez , 488 F. 3d 1020 (D .C. Cir. 2007). 
Jus ti ce Kavana ug h was part of a maj o ri ty dec ision that 
rej ected an ESA co nsultat io n chall enge to the Departme nt of 
Commerce's approva l of lo ng line fi shing in the A tlanti c Ocean 
a nd G ul f of M ex ico of swordfis h and tuna.54 Despite undi sputed 
c ie ntifi c evidence that lo ng line fi shing is killing too many 
endangered leatherback turtl es, Justice Kavanaugh and hi s panel 
dec ided fo r the Bush Commerce Department. 55 As the majority 
conceded at the end of their opinion " since the [Reasonable and 
Prudent A lte rn ati ve] a lready includes hook and gea r removal 
require ments, ' the only rema ining way to achi eve further reduc-
ti o ns in leath erback morta lity in the pe lag ic long line fi shery 
wo uld be through closures that reduce fi shing effort in areas of 
hi g h leatherback bycatch. "'56 A ltho ugh the federal agency had 
the autho ri ty to issue such c losures, it dec lined to do so here and 
many enda ngered sea turtl es consequently died .57 
Ju s tice K avana ugh D ec is ion in Oceana, Inc.: Aga inst 
Wildli fe Species 
A merican Bird Conservancy v. Federal Communications 
Commission , 5 16 F.3 d 1027 (D .C. C ir. 2008) (Di sse nting 
Opinio n by Justi ce Kavanaug h). 
The maj ori ty opinion ruled that the Federa l Communications 
Commi ss io n (FCC) v iolated both NEPA and Section 7 of the 
E SA because of ce ll tower a pprova ls in the Gulf Coast region 
that harmed many bird species. 58 Justi ce K avanaugh di ssented, 
ca lling the lawsuit by conservation groups " unripe."59 The two 
maj ority j udges stated in respo nse to Justi ce Kavanaugh: 
6 
O ur di ssenting co lleague 's assertio n that thi s case is 
unripe ... rests on the mistaken ass umptio n that the 
C ommiss io n has set a bo ut reconsidering Petitioner ' s 
preci se requests throug h its nationwide inquiry into the 
migratory bird issue. H owever . .. [the Commi ss ion] 
nowhe re indi cates [it is] reconsidering the Gul f Coast 
pe titi o n calling for a progra mmati c E nvironmental 
Impact Sta te me nt under EPA , fo rma l consultati on 
under the ESA, or notice of pending tower registration 
applications.60 
In addi tion, not even the FCC made Justice Kavanaugh 's 
extreme argument, as the majori ty noted: " [n]either po in t is 
lost on the Commission: not onl y does its brief not invoke the 
ripeness doctrine, but whil e the Commi ss ion explicitly deferred 
considerati on of Petitioners' MBTA cla im to the nati o nwide 
proceeding, it denied and di smissed Petitioners ' ESA and NEPA 
claims. "61 
Justi ce Kavanaugh Decision in American Bird Conservancy: 
Against Wildli fe Species 
North Carolina Fisheries Association v. Gutierrez, 550 F.3d 16 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
Fishermen won a federa l di strict court dec ision under the 
Magnuson- Stevens F ishery Conservati on and Management 
Act for the MFS 's failure to promulgate a rebuilding plan fo r 
certai n fis h spec ies fo llowing a determination that such spec ies 
were "overfi shed ."62 After the di stri ct court approved a remedy 
unsatisfactory to the plainti ff fi shermen, the D.C. Circui t heard 
the appea l. 63 Ju sti ce Kavanaug h a nd hi s panel rej ected the 
requested remedy by the fis hermen, opining that while it "does 
seem rather peculiar - perhaps even a bit fi shy - that the Service 
p ro mulgated Amendment I SA without accompanying regula-
tions .. . we lack jurisdiction at thi s stage in the proceedings ."64 
The court di smissed the case on j urisdi ctional grounds, despi te 
the plainti ff fi shem1en 's strong claims on the merits. 
Justi ce Kavanaugh Deci s ion North Carolina Fisheries 
Association : Against Wildli fe Species 
Eastern Niagara Public Power Alliance v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 558 F.3d 564 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Opin ion 
by Justice Kavanaugh). 
Justi ce Kavanaugh dec ided again st several communiti es 
in wes tern New York who were chall e nging a 2007 Federal 
E nergy Regulatory Commiss ion (FERC) li cens ing dec ision that 
approved the ew York Power Authority 's ( YPA) fi fty-year 
re li censing application to operate the N iagara Power Proj ect, a 
hydroelectric fac ility about fi ve miles downri ver from N iagara 
Fa ll s.65 The Federal Power Act directs FERC to issue li censes 
for the "construction, operation, and maintenance of hydroe lec-
tri c proj ects on certain U.S. waters," and in ruling on the li cens-
ing applications fo r hydroelectri c fac iliti es, FERC must consider 
an array of criteri a.66 Some of these criteri a include energy con-
servation , the protection offi sh and wildli fe , rec reationa l oppor-
tuniti es, and environmental quali ty. Additionall y, for re li censing 
applications, factors include the project's safety, efficiency, re li-
ability, and its effects on the communities it se rves. 67 In arguing 
against FERC, the plainti ffs made several arguments, inc luding: 
( 1) that a fifty-year li cense was too long and not consistent 
w ith agency p racti ce regarding the terms of li censes; and (2) 
that FERC, as a condition of granting the li cense, should have 
required the state power agency to mitigate certa in adverse envi-
ronmental impacts a ll egedl y caused by the proj ect, parti cularl y 
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shoreline erosion.68 Justi ce Kavanaugh ruled against wildli fe by 
holding that the fi fty-year license to operate the N iagara Power 
Project was " reasonable" despi te the real negative impacts the 
New York citizens had identifi ed with the FERC project.69 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision Eastern Niagara Public Power 
Alliance: Against Wildli fe Species 
Otay Mesa, LP v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 646 F.3d 9 14 
(D.C. Cir. 20 11 ) (Opinion by Justi ce Kavanaugh).70 
Justi ce Kavanaugh wrote the decisio n upho lding the ESA 
challenge by the real estate industry, which sought rejection of 
the FWS designation of criti cal habi tat fo r the San Diego fa iry 
shrimp.71 Although the federal di stri ct court judge in thi s case 
found , based on expert bio logist testimony, that the "FWS was 
reasonabl e in its consideration that San Diego fairy shrimp 
found in a hospitable location in 200 I would have also occupi ed 
the same location in 1997[,]"72 Justi ce Kavanaug h was unim-
pressed with federal sc ientifi c experti se.73 Justi ce Kavanaugh 
overturned the di str ict court's factual assessment, finding that 
the FWS needed to continue looking for the rare habitat of a 
highl y endangered spec ies.74 The court remanded the case to the 
Agency.75 
Justi ce Kavanaugh Decision in Otay Mesa, LP: Against 
Wildli fe Spec ies 
Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp , 66 1 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 201 2). 
ln this case, Justi ce Kavanaugh was on a pane l that ruled 
almost entirely on behalf of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
and the decision to issue a permit autho ri zing the di scharge 
of dredge and fi ll materi a l into spec ified wetlands - including 
waters of the United States - outside rapidly developing Tampa, 
Florida.76 Although the di stri ct court had fo und the Corps to be 
in violation of the Clean Water Act, Justice Kavanaugh's panel 
reversed almost in its enti rety.77 Conservati oni sts argued that 
the project adversely impacted the wood stork and the indigo 
snake.78 The panel and Justi ce Kavanaugh rejected further pro-
tections for the wood stork .79 For the indigo snake, despite unre-
butted expert testimony from the FWS bio logist about negative 
impacts to the snake, the court stated "we do not reach the issue 
of whether formal [ESA Section 7] consultation is required, but 
the Corps must make some determination on the issue of habi-
tat fragmentation·, both for ESA and NEPA purposes."80 Thus, 
Justi ce Kavanaugh ruled aga inst the wood stork and though he 
ruled in favor of the indi go snake, he did not order a biolog i-
ca l opinion for the spec ies, as he was authori zed to do, and that 
could have helped the snake the most.81 
Justice Kavanaugh Decis ion in Sierra Club: Three-Quarters 
Aga inst Wildlife/One-Quarter fo r Wildlife Species82 
Friends of the Blackwater v. Salazar, 69 1 F.3d 428 (D.C. C ir. 
201 2). 
Justi ce Kavanaugh was part of a majority that overturned 
a federal di strict court dec ision in favor of the West Virg inia 
Northern Fly ing Squirrel and its recovery plan .83 Justi ce 
Kavanaugh interpreted the recovery plan as non-binding and 
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a llowed the de listing of thi s spec ies despite the fact the require-
ments of the recovery plan were not met. 84 As Circuit Judge 
Rogers stated in di ssent: 
[Justi ce Kavanaugh] defers to the Secretary's inter-
pretation, contrary to the plain text of the Endangered 
Species Act . .. that [the squirre l] loses all protection 
even though the recovery criteri a in its recovery plan 
have not been met and those criteri a are revised ... 
without required noti ce and prio r considerati on of 
public comments. But even ass uming, as the court 
concludes , the ESA is ambi guo us, the Secretary was 
arbitrary and capricious in deli sting the squirrel based 
in materi a l part on an analys is rev ising the recovery 
plant criteria that was not public ly noticed until the 
fin al de li sting rule .. . . s5 
Thi s dec is ion not onl y was a loss for the squirrels, but it a lso 
was a loss of a significant ro llback of the conservation force of 
ESA recovery plans.86 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision in Friends of the Blackwater : 
Against Wildlife Species 
Conservation Force v. Jewell, 733 F.3 d 1200 (D.C . Cir. 201 3). 
Judge Merrick Garl and wrote fo r the unanimous panel that 
inc luded Just ice Kavanaugh, and rul ed against the pla inti ffs 
(backed by the Sierra Club) who were cha ll eng ing the F WS 's 
protection, management and import permitting of the markho r, 
"an impress ive subspecies of wild goat that inhabits an arid , 
moun ta inous reg ion of Paki stan." 87 Despite repeated delays 
in responding to the plaintiffs by the Agency before the liti ga-
tion was fil ed, the maj ority panel he ld that the cause of actio n 
to down-list the spec ies was moot beca use the plainti ffs pos-
sessed no standing to challenge the FWS's cons iderable delays 
in process ing permits.88 This case was a split dec ision because, 
a lthoug h the conservation action sought by the plaintiffs was 
questionable, the court did correctl y opine on the process ing 
delays by the Agency.89 
Justi ce Kavanaugh Dec ision in Conservation Force: Half-
Against Wildli fe Spec ies/Half-fo r Wildli fe Species 
Center for Biological Diversity v. U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 749 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 20 14). 
Th e plainti ffs chall enged the EPA's de lays in issuing 
required new " secondary" nationa l ambient air quality standards 
fo r ox ides of nitrogen, ox ides of sulphur, and other re lated com-
pounds that contribute to ac id ra in. 90 The impacts from acid ra in 
can be devastating to ecosystems, from harming water bodies of 
a ll kinds and sizes, to killing many plants and trees in certa in fo r-
ests.91 The EPA had already admitted that the current secondary 
air standards were "not adequate to protect against the adverse 
impacts of aquatic ac idifi cation on sens iti ve ecosystems."92 
However, because the EPA convinced a panel, which inc luded 
Justice Kavanaugh, that it was not yet "certain" it could promul-
gate a standard, Justi ce Kavanaugh and hi s fe llow judges let the 
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EPA off the hook for a clear obligation of the Clean Air Act. 93 
The court concluded: "[i]n other words, the fact that we have 
rejected certainty as an appropriate goal ... does not mean that 
regulation is required (or permitted) no matter how much uncer-
tainty the agency faces."94 By allowing the EPA off the hook, 
Justice Kavanaugh once again ruled against needed protections 
for wildlife. 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision in Center for Biological 
Diversity: Against Wildlife Species 
Friends of Animals v. Ashe, 808 F.3d 900 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(Opinion by Justice Kavanaugh). 
In March 2012, Friends of Animals petitioned the FWS to 
list ten species of sturgeon as endangered or threatened species 
under the ESA.95 The ESA obligates the Agency to make an 
initial determination on the species petition within ninety days 
after receipt of the petition. 96 However, the FWS issued no 
determinations for any of the species petitioned .97 On August 
16, 2013 , well beyond the ninety-day period, Friends of Animals 
sent the FWS written notice, as required by statute prior to filing 
a lawsuit, that the Agency had failed to make initial and final 
determinations for the ten species of sturgeon.98 The federal 
government argued that Friends of Animals had failed to pro-
vide proper notice of the lawsuit.99 Justice Kavanaugh wrote the 
majority opinion for the Court 100 and stated that, 
[t]he question here- whether Friends of Animals com-
plied with the notice requirement of the Act- boils 
down to a very narrow and extraordinarily technical 
question regarding the timing of notice," and that 
" [because] Friends of Animals did not wait until after 
the issuance of the positive initial determinations to 
provide 60 days' notice of the allegedly overdue final 
determinations, its suit seeking to compel the final 
determinations is barred .10 1 
Here, Justice Kavanaugh found a way to deny the plaintiffs 
an opportunity to protect wildlife threatened with extinction .102 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision in Friends of Animals: Against 
Wildlife Species 
Def enders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
A panel that included Justice Kavanaugh ruled against ESA 
protections for the dunes sagebrush lizard of New Mexico and 
Texas, whose habitat closely overlaps with current and potential 
drilling actions by the oil and gas industry. 103 The court con-
sidered whether a weak and unenforceable state management 
agreement could be considered in denying ESA protections 
for the lizard. 104 Despite serious problems with the Texas plan 
especially, the panel side-stepped the issue of adequacy of the 
state conservation plans by noting that the Department of the 
Interior had "new information" from the states and the federal 
agencies. 105 Further, the industry itself that indicated "current 
and future threats are not of sufficient imminence, intensity, or 
magnitude to indicate that the lizard ... is in danger of extinction, 
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or likely to be become endangered within the foreseeable 
future ." 106 Thus, Justice Kavanaugh supported a spurious policy 
reversal by the FWS that lessened protections for the lizard. 107 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision in Def enders of Wildlife: 
Against Wildlife Species 
Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 816 F.3d 119 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
Justice Kavanaugh was part of a panel that ruled against 
full protections for "roadless areas" under the National Forest 
Management Act and EPA. 108 Despite the statute requirement 
that road less areas contain no roads or developments, this panel 
allowed the Forest Service to permit ski facilities in prime wild-
life habitat for the lynx and countless other species, based upon 
the discretion of the Agency to exclude certain multiple use areas 
from roadless protection under the original Clinton-era roadless 
rule. 109 The result of the decision here is to allow recreational 
skiing on approximately 8,300 acres of land despite the harm to 
the lynx's habitat. 11 0 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision Ark Initiative: Against Wildlife 
Species 
Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 824 F.3d l 033 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
The plaintiffs and appellants attempted to protect three 
species of ESA-listed foreign antelopes: the scimitar-horned 
oryx, addax, and dama gazelle. 11 1 After the George W. Bush 
Administration issued an import take permit exemption for 
these three highly endangered mammals, 11 2 Friends of Animals 
successfully sued to stop the harmful practice of sport hunt 
importing. 113 After that previous litigation, Congress passed 
a rider on an appropriations bill allowing the FWS exemption 
program for the three species of antelope. 11 4 The D.C. Circuit, 
including Justice Kavanaugh, upheld Congress ' ability to pass 
such riders: "Congress acted within constitutional bounds when 
it passed Section 127. Therefore, there can be no doubt that 
the [FWS] was fully authorized to reinstate the Captive-Bred 
Exemption ." 11 5 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision Friends of Animals: Against 
Wildlife Species 
Earthreports, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
Justice Kavanaugh was part of a panel that ruled against 
species protection, including NEPA protections on behalf of 
the highly endangered North Atlantic right whale. 116 At issue in 
this case was approval of the highly controversial Cove Point 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant off the west shore of the 
Chesapeake Bay, Maryland. 11 7 The judges, including Justice 
Kavanaugh, held that " because petitioners fail to show that 
the Commission's NEPA analysis was deficient for failing to 
consider indirect effects of the Cove Point conversion project 
or inadequately considered their remaining concerns and that 
[FERC] thus acted arbitrarily and capriciously, we deny the 
petition for review." 11 8 Justice Kavanaugh here disregarded the 
plaintiff's attempt to protect species under NEPA, by deferring 
Sustainable Development Law & Policy 
to FERC's questionable determination of neg ligible impact to 
the wildlife species. 11 9 
Justice Kavanaugh Decision Earthreports, Inc: Against 
Wildli fe Spec ies 
Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 829 F.3d 7 10 (D.C. C ir. 201 6) (Di ssenting Opinion by 
Justi ce Kavanaugh). 
Justi ce Kavanaugh wrote a defi ant di ssent in a case invo lv-
ing the waste caused by mountaintop removal to mine coa l. 120 
Although the EPA had voluminous sc ientific studi es demon-
strating that dumping thi s waste into ri vers and streams would 
have an " unacceptable adverse impacts" to the environment and 
wildlife spec ies, Justice Kavanaugh would have issued the min-
ing company the permit, which the EPA had revoked through its 
clear and unambiguous authori ty under the Clean Water Act. 121 
In other words, Justi ce Kavanaugh had no problem with the coal 
company continuing to pollute and destroy ri vers and streams 
with their waste from an industri al practi ce that a lready greatly 
contr ibutes to global warmi ng and tox ic air pollution. 122 Justice 
Kavanaugh argued that the coal company's cost-benefit analys is 
should override the Agency's public hea lth assessments. 123 As 
the majori ty sa id of Justi ce Kavanaugh's di ssent: 
In reply to our di ssenting co ll eague 's one-paragraph 
cri de coeur characte ri zing Mingo Logan's fo rfe iture 
as "entire ly un fa ir" based on EPA's stance that costs are 
" irre levant," . .. we have an equally pithy reply: A party 
has an obligation to substanti ate its pos ition, includ-
ing in the face of its opponent 's rejection thereof . . . . 
Forfe iture here is hardly " unfa ir" to Mingo Logan but, 
in any event, its minima l proof of its costs- as far as 
we can te ll- mirrors their de minimis nature. And even 
if the EPA could be tagged with the " bait-and-switch" 
charge- a propos ition we roundl y rej ect- Mingo 
Logan 's fa ilure to prove up its costs on rev iew by the 
di strict court should mute its lament. In the end , Mingo 
Logan at no po int- not before the EPA nor in di stri ct 
court- made any effort to describe its costs or make an 
argument about them. In that li ght, Mingo Logan can 
hardly now complain about unfa irness. Moreo ver, as 
we have noted . .. Mingo Logan effecti ve ly accepted 
the EPA's pos ition on the relevance of its re li ance 
costs. It is hardly " unfai r" to expect Mingo Logan to 
have rai sed whatever arguments it might have about the 
EPA's pos ition before the EPA itse lf. 124 
Thus, Justi ce Kavanaugh 's attempt to illega lly insert cost-
benefi t ana lys is into a case could have had di sastrous impacts on 
many spec ies within the Appalachian ecosystems. 125 
Justi ce Kavanaugh Dec is ion in Mingo Logan Coal Co. : 
Against Wildlife Species 
Carpenters Industrial Council v. Zinke, 854 F. 3d I (D.C. C ir. 
201 7) (Opinion by Justice Kavanaugh). 
Fall 20I 8 
Justi ce Kavanaug h wrote the majority opinion fo r thi s 
case, in which the timber industry sued FWS over its des ig na-
tion of criti ca l habitat fo r the northern spotted ow l in the Pac ific 
orthwest. 126 In 201 2, the FWS des ignated 9.5 million acres of 
federal fo rest lands in Ca li fo rnia, Oregon, and Washington as 
criti ca l habitat for the northern spotted owl under the ESA . 127 In 
response to the des ignati on, the plainti ff, a forest products man-
ufacturing trade assoc iation compri sed of companies that source 
timber from those forest lands, sued the FWS to chall enge the 
lega lity of thi s critica l habitat des ignation. 128 Justi ce Kavanaugh 
opened hi s dec is ion by sta ting that, " [ w ]hen the government 
adopts a rule that makes it more diffi cult to harvest timbe r fro m 
certain fo rest lands, lumber companies that obta in timber fro m 
those fo rest lands may lose a source of timber suppl y and suffer 
economi c harm. " 129 Justi ce Kavanaugh furth er noted that the 
di splacement of the timber industry in the Pac ific Northwest as 
a prime economic force has been a "phenomenon occur[ing] in 
the Pacific N orthwest ... . " 130 Responding to the questi on of 
whether or not the plainti ffs had standing to cha llenge the F WS 
des ignation of criti ca l habitat, Justi ce Kavanaugh ruled that the 
Council had demonstrated a 
[S]ubstanti a l probability that the criti ca l habitat des-
ignation will cause a decrease in the suppl y of timber 
from the des ignated fo rest lands, that Counc il Membe rs 
obta in their timber fro m those fo rest lands, and that 
Council members will suffe r economic harm as a result 
o f the decrease in the timber suppl y from those fo rest 
lands. 131 
Justice Kavanaugh rul ed squarely in favo r of the timber and 
wood products industry and aga inst the conservation and p rotec-
ti on of wildli fe. 132 
Justi ce Kavanaug h Dec is io n in Carpenters Industrial 
Council: Aga inst Wildli fe Spec ies 
West Virginia v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, acti ve 
and pending, D.C. C ircuit (Case No. 15-1 363) (after stay and 
remand by U.S Supreme Court). 
This ongoing litigation concerns foss il fuel states and indus-
tri es aga inst the Obama Clean Power Plan, which seeks to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) po llution from utiliti es under Secti o n 
111 of the Clean A ir Act. 133 At the two-day ora l a rgument before 
the D. C. Circuit in September 201 6, Justice Kavanaugh asserted 
that " [t]he policy is laudable. The earth is warming. Humans 
are contributing. 1 understand the international impact a nd the 
problem of the commons. The pope's in vo lved . If Congress does 
thi s, they can account fo r the people who lose the ir j obs. If we 
do thi s, we can ' t. " 134 Justi ce Kavanaugh's lega l pos ition on c li-
mate change is deceitful fo r severa l reasons. F irs t, Congress has 
a lready "done thi s" through the C lean A ir Act, w hich not only 
commands that the EPA reduce a ll a ir po llutants that are fo und 
to harm human hea lth and public we lfare, but a lso spec ifica lly 
includes the term "climate" as part of w hat the Agency must 
consider as "effects" on public we lfa re. 135 Equall y problemati c, 
9 
Justice Kavanaugh's position ts at odds with the Supreme 
Court 's historic decision in Massachusetts v. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 136 where a coalition of states and environ-
mental groups defeated the George W. Bush Administration's 
refusal to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act; the Supreme 
Court squarely held that the EPA does have such authority and 
must utilize it. 137 Finally, as it relates to the power of Congress, 
Justice Kavanaugh has unequivocally and _repeatedly attacked 
Congress ional attempts to limit the amount of money and the 
secrecy of money in federal e lections. 138 
The C lean Power Plan 1 itigation cuts to the heart of a central 
legal question to all of env ironmenta l and wildlife law: would 
Justice Kavanaugh support any meaningful attempt by the EPA 
to regulate and limit GHGs, or would he throw his lot behind 
President Trump and the small industry handful who still deny 
climate change is even a problem? Further, wou ld Justice 
Kavanau gh support a repeal or weakening of Massachusetts 
v. US. Environmental Protection Agency, either by supporting 
a repeal or weakening of the carbon dioxide/greenhouse gas 
endangerment finding(s) or by judicially effectuating or bless-
ing agency inaction on any meaningful regulatory response to 
an endangerment findin g.139 Thousands of plant and animal spe-
c ies, on land and in water, are at grave risk beca use of g lobal 
warming and climate change. 140 
Ju stice Kavanaugh pos ition in West Virgin ia: Against 
Wildlife Species. 
V. THE FUTURE FOR WILDLIFE 
UNDER KAVANAUGH 
While it is undeniably typical for most long-standing federal 
judges to rule for and again st certain interests based upon the 
facts and law of a particular case, as well as the specific proce-
dural history of the case, it is nonetheless unusual for a judge on 
the federal bench to rule cons istently aga inst one set of interests 
over another. Justice Kavanaugh regularly and routinely decided 
in favor of corporate and industrial interests over the "public 
ENDNOTES 
See Seung Min Kim & John Wagner, Kavanaugh sworn in as Supreme 
Court justice after divided Senate votes for corifirmation, WASH. POST (Oct. 
I 0, 20 18), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kavanaugh-vote-divided-
senate-poised-to-confirm-trumps-nominee/20 18/10/06/64bf69fa-c969- I I e8-
b2b5-79270f9cce I 7 _story.html?utm_ term=.c3e6df30c49c. 
2 Current Members, SUPREME COURT, https://www .supremecourt.gov/about/ 
biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 20 18). 
3 Letter from Alaska Wilderness League et a l. on Opposing the Supreme 
Court om inat ion of Judge Bretl Kavanaugh to Chuck Grass ley et al. , Chair-
man, Senate Judicia l Comm. (Aug. 10, 20 18), https://www.c leanwateraction . 
org/s ites/default/files/docs/publications/Oppose%20Judge%20Kavanaugh%20 
Environmental%20Community%201etter%208- I 0- 18. pdf. 
4 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 ( 1805). 
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6 See infra Appendix A. 
See infra Appendix B. 
The a uthor used Bloomberg Law to complete this search . See BLOOMBERG 
LAW, https://www.bna.com/bloomberglaw/ (last vis ited Dec. 20, 20 18). 
9 Id. 
10 
interest. " 14 1 As it relates to wi ldli fe species cases specifically, 
Justice Kavanaugh's meager four percent favorab le deci sion 
record on behalf of wildlife "species" is alarming. 
Justice Kavanaugh is a man who apparently has already 
made up his mind . He frequentl y stretches statutes to comport 
with his own personal policy view of the world. Ninety-six per-
cent of the time, Mother Earth loses under Justice Kavanaugh. 
Again, Justice Kavanaugh 's paltry four percent pro-wildlife 
record is far outside the judicia l mainstream as compared to 
a conservative (Judge Sentelle with a forty-three percent pro-
wildli fe record) and a moderate (Garland with fifty-six percent 
pro-wildlife record) judge. 
In the summer and autumn of 20 18, a rational defender 
of wildlife conservation could have concluded that possess ing 
only eight Justices for a few extra months might have served 
the Court, and the country, better in the long run.142 At the very 
least, no final vote should have occurred in the Senate until all of 
Justice Kavanaugh's governmental records were released to the 
public. 143 The stakes are now too high for the Supreme Court's 
deciding vote to be driven by party allegiance. We need a truly 
independent and fair jurist on the Supreme Court at this pivotal 
point in the country's history. How many other Trump appoin-
tees are li ke Justice Kavanaugh? 144 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Un less he resigns or is impeached, Justice Kavanaugh will 
have a lasting impact on the U.S. Supreme Court and the laws 
of our country. From wi ldli fe 's perspective, Justi ce Kavanaugh 
possesses the angry hand, the one that writes hostil e decision 
after hostile decision against the public 's unique interest in wild-
life. The dusky gopher frogs in Weyerhaeuser Company v. U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service are certain ly happy Mr. Kavanaugh 
was still a judge when that case was heard before the high court. 
Only a change of heart by the Justice himself wi ll ensure future 
justice for wildl ife in the United States.145 
10 See infra Part 111. 
11 See Edward E. Shea, Environmental Law a/the United States, COMP. 
E YTL. LA w & REG. § 56 : I (Nicholas A. Robinson et al. eds. , 2018). 
12 See id. ; see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S . 322, 324 (1979) (discuss-
ing state governments' trustee ro le in protecting wildlife not otherw ise pro-
tected by the federa l government); Lacoste v. Dep 't of Conservation, 263 U.S. 
186, 187 ( 1924) (d iscuss ing state ownership of wild animals within that state's 
territory) . 
13 The original Lacey Act, amended severa l times subsequentl y, was written 
to prevent wildli fe taken in violation of one state 's laws to be taken to another 
state. 16 U.S.C. §§ 337 1-78 (20 12); see also 1934 Fish and Wildlife Conserva-
tion Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 66 1-667(c) (20 12) (requiring the federa l government to 
minimize and mitigate the adverse impacts upon wi ldli fe from federa l projects). 
14 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 153 1-1544 [here inafter ESA]. 
15 See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S .C. §§ 136 1- 142 l(h) [here-
inafter MMPA] (emphasizing that marine mammals should be protected, and 
the primary objective shou ld be to maintain the health and stability of marine 
ecosystems). 
continued on page 24 
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APPENDICES: 
A p ATTERN OF RULING AGAINST MOTHER NATURE: 
W ILDLIFE S PECIES C ASES D ECIDED BY J USTICE KAVANAUGH 
ON THE DC C IRCUIT 
By William J. Snape, III* 
APPENDIX A 
J udge Sentelle's Wildlife Decisions 
Case 
Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 824 F .3d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
Am. Wild/ands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
Nat. Ass 'n. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
Defs. of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys.for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
Ctr.for Biological Diversity v. U. S. Dep 't. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partn. v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Majority Opinion) 
Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F .3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Majority Opinion) 
Marcum v. Salazar, 694 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 20 12) (Majority Opin ion) 
Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 411 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Majority Opinion) 
Animal Legal Def Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Majority Opinion) 
Defs. of Wildlife & Sierra Club v. Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Majority Opinion) 
Rhinelander Paper Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 405 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Majority Opinion) 
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partn. v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Majority Opinion) 
Grunewald v. Jarvis , 776 F.3d 893 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Majority Opinion) 
C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931F.2d1556 (D.C. Cir. 199 1) 
Ala. Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 979 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
Ctr.for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 749 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
S.D. Warren Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 164 Fed. Appx. l (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
Nat. Ass 'n. of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng 'rs, 264 Fed. Appx. 10 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
Am. Rivers & Ala. Rivers All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 895 F.3d 32 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
Nat 'I Wildlife Federation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 912 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
Fla. Audubon Soc 'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
27 TOT AL CASES 
11.5 CASES FOR WILDLIFE 
43% FOR WILDLIFE 
57% AGAINST WILDLIFE 
Notes 
Against wi ldli fe 
For wi ldlife 
Against wildlife 
Against wildlife 
Against wild life 
Against wildlife 
Half for wi ldlife 
Half for wi ldlife 
Against wi ldlife 
Against wildlife 
For wildlife 
For wild life 
Against wild li fe 
For wild li fe 
For wi ldlife 
Against wi ldlife 
Half/half 
Against wildlife 
For wildl ife 
Against wildlife 
For wi ldlife 
For wildlife 
For wi ldlife 
Against wi ldlife 
For wi ldlife 
Against wi ldlife 
Against wi ldlife 
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APPEN DI X B 
Judge Garland's Wildlife Decision 
Case Notes 
Safari Club Int '! & Nat'/ Rifle Ass 'n of Am. v. Zinke, 878 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2017) Half for/half against wildlife 
Am. Wild/ands v. Kempthorne, 5~0 F.3d 991 (D.C. Cir. 2008) Against wildlife 
In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig. (Safari Club Int 'Iv. 
Half for/half against 
Salazar) , 709 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872 (D.C. Cir. 2006) Half for/half against 
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton , 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003) For wildlife 
Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2013) Half for/half against 
Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. Fed. Commc 'n Comm 'n, 516 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008) For wi ldlife 
Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 661F.3d1147 (D.C. Cir. 2012) Three quarters against/ 
one quarter for 
Swanson Grp. Mfg., LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2015) For wildlife 
Animal Legal Def Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000) Against wildlife 
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partn. v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497 (D .C. Cir. 2010) Against wildlife 
Gerber v. Norton , 294 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2002) For wi ldlife 
Grunewald v. Jarvis , 776 F.3d 893 (D.C. Cir. 2015) Half for/half against 
Humane Soc 'y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2000) For wi ldlife 
Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2011) For wi ldlife 
Conservation Law Found. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 216 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000) Against wildlife 
Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2000) One half for/one half against 
17 TOT AL CASE 
9.25 FOR SPECIES 
54% FOR WILDLIFE 
46% AGAINST WILDLIFE 
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